Goethe’s “Der Erlkönig” (“The Alder King”) – a new translation

The Alder King

translated by James M. Kopf


Who rides late in a night so wild?
It is the father with his child.
He has the boy wholly in arm,
He tucks him tight, he keeps him warm.


“My son, why hide your face?”
“Don’t you see, father, the Alder King in this place?
The Alder King with crown and cloak?”
“My son, it’s fog, like a wisp of smoke.”

“You, lovely child, come along with me,
We’ll play some games all fancy free;
So many colorful flowers by the brook,
My mother’s sewing you some golden cloth. Look!”

“My father, my father, can you not hear
What the Alder King whispers in my ear?”
“Calm, my son, be calm and still,
The wind’s crying through the trees like a whippoorwill.”

“You, fine boy, don’t you want to come?
My daughters they will serve you – and then some;
My daughters will dance the night song
And soon, with their lullaby, sleep comes along.”

“My father, my father, right over there,
The Alder King’s daughters in his grey lair?”
“My son, my son, of course I see,
The shadow of an old willow tree.”

“I love you, dear boy, you are so fair,
But if you’re not willing, no effort will I spare.”
“My father, my father, he’s pulling me t’wards him!
The Alder King has done me something grim!”

The father rides like the wind in fear,
Clutching the son he holds so dear,
And arrives home full of struggle and dread;
In his arms, the child was dead.

AI, The Slow Death of Language Programs, and What Might Come Next

Much of the discourse surrounding AI in higher education has centered squarely on academic integrity and concerns about cheating. In many ways, this echoes past doomsday declarations that accompany any significant innovation in the organization and dissemination of knowledge and goods. The internet was going to be used as a marketplace where people would sell papers that students could pass off as their own! Students could copy and paste from websites! Such cheating, of course, does happen – though if an instructor or TA who has worked with a student for the entirety of a semester cannot tell whether an essay was actually written by that student, there are other issues at play. Moreover, tools – based on the internet – exist to minimize the risk of such instances of plagiarism, such as TurnItIn, though many instructors, myself included, choose not to use it because they view it as based on the exploitation of students’ intellectual property and labor. The internet may have made cheating easier, but it hardly spelled the end of academic integrity. These misgivings are nothing new and have cropped up over things that essentially all of us now view as borderline indispensable. Witness the horror that gripped many upon the rise of… the book index. Such technology would, after all, make reading the entirety of a book no longer necessary.

At the end of the day, indexes, the internet, and, yes, AI are tools. Radically disruptive tools, but tools nonetheless. Methods can be implemented to minimize the risk of cheating. The easiest one to prevent students from using AI to write term papers? Don’t have students write term papers. There are innumerable other metrics to grade mastery of material. Instructors can rely more heavily on punctilious participation policies that may, for example, demand that students come prepared not just to refer to material but to cite it in class. And there is always the possible rejuvenation of the old classic: the rigorous oral examination. These two examples are not applicable, obviously, to all situations or contexts, but it would be quite something to see a reemergence of classical rhetoric, which has, after all, gotten short shrift in comparison to its academic partner, composition.

All of this is to say that all information and communication technologies come with trade-offs. The basics of academic integrity are not going to be one of them. What is truly frightening is the risk of obsolescence. Copyists disappeared in the blink of an historical eye after Gutenberg invented, in the European context, the movable type printing press. The Pony Express folded after 18 months due to the rise of better telegraphy. Of all the disciplines in contemporary academia, the most at risk of obsolescence from the rise of AI are language programs – German, French, Japanese, etc. etc.

It’s not like language programs haven’t been dying a slow death anyhow. Like many disciplines (and institutions themselves), they faced a sharp contraction of enrollments during the pandemic. Many departments have not recovered. A colleague of mine has complained to me that, among existing students (not incoming freshmen), only 2 have enrolled in the introductory level of their language. This is compounded by “cost-cutting” (really, blood-letting) policies by administrations that frequently target language programs. Tenure-lines are not being replaced, much less added. Many institutions have started to eliminate majors and even minors in language studies programs. Plenty of others have eliminated language requirements entirely, leaving programs, many of which had been run in a sense of complacency for decades because there would always be some enrollment, scrambling to attract students who no longer had any institutional motivation to learn a language.

It’s tempting to place the blame squarely on the STEMB-ification (yes, the B is intentional – it stands for the growing emphasis on Business schools/departments) of education, especially higher education. Ideally, investing in scientific disciplines is, naturally, not a bad thing. However, such investment, in reality, comes with the consequence of shouldering to the side the traditional role of higher education, which, yes, some of us still believe in, namely the creation of well-rounded, thoughtful people who can critically navigate and interpret the world and cultivate a rich inner life. While such a view of the university has rarely, if ever, truly existed outside of the minds of pie-eyed dreamers, what it has certainly been replaced with is a transactional view of education. “I go into debt to network and get a piece of paper that tells me I can be adequately employable within the highest-paying fields.” (To be clear, this is the fault of capitalism, not the fault of students. In an age of ever-increasing precarity, who could blame them for simply, at the very least, buying into the only ideology they’ve ever known?) Seen in this transactional way, language programs provide a poor return on investment (ROI); they’re an undesirable, especially given the horrendous way most English-speaking American students are taught their own language, which necessitates, as anyone who has ever taught a language course knows, remedial grammar education, and unnecessary roadblock towards a degree – a roadblock that often accompanies a drop in one’s GPA.

AI is proving that the students may, if not be correct, then at least have a point. AIs, like ChatGPT, function by employing unbelievably vast reservoirs of language to predict the word or phrase most likely to follow another word or phrase. This is why it is so easy to lead astray with certain, especially mathematical, problems, but it is also precisely why it will change the way people communicate with each other across language barriers forever (or at least until the grid goes down). Translation apps can expect to see a shocking rise in accuracy, even in languages with complex grammar. German grammar has long been a bane for translation software because of, for example, its heady combination of cases, genders, and applicable adjective endings. When knowledge of grammar in a translation system is supplemented or even supplanted by statistical likelihood, the odds of a translation nailing every single bit of the target language becomes increasingly, well, likely. In a few years at the very most, people will have easy access to translation software that will, for the overwhelming majority of everyday conversations, be not just acceptable but good. Really, really good. Almost instantaneous, with suggestions about how to reply – while we’ll likely never have Star Trek’s universal translators, we’ll be getting close with known, Terran languages. Over 50 at last count.

For decades, fears have persisted that the hegemonic dominance of the United States would lead to an increasingly monolingual culture across the globe. (The Académie Française has, for years, tried to mitigate the influence of English on the French language, but, try as they might, a normal person in France will still say “le parking” instead of “garage de stationnement.” The Germans refer to the neologism “soundscape” as “das Soundscape,” instead of something like “die Klangschaft.” Examples are endless.) What AI-aided translation promises is, in fact, a new polylingualism. Why, after all, learn a new language when you can use software to switch nearly seamlessly between the two for most quotidian concerns?

 The answer lies, of course, in that “nearly” and that “most.” Learning another language, and learning it well, means that a person can be, oftentimes, incredibly more nuanced and precise than is possible through existing software. There are also the motivations of passion and/or, in the case of interpersonal relationships, intimacy. People will continue to learn other languages to communicate with loved ones, and, in the business and political contexts, personal connections (who may have the legitimate added fear of privacy concerns while using apps that are reliant on recording conversations).

Certain language progams in the US context will continue to, if not thrive, at least survive for many more years because of these reasons. Spanish continues to pack classrooms because it’s the second most spoken language in the United States by an order of magnitude (in other words, it’s likely that its ROI is significantly higher than other languages). Chinese enrollments will also remain strong; despite geopolitical turbulence (which also drives enrollments among those of the polisci/international relations departments), commerce between the two nations is strong and likely to increase, at the very least, in the short term. In areas with large populations of heritage speakers or people of ethnic descent from a particular group, those language programs will continue to prosper. Schools in central Pennsylvania, with a large population of German-speaking descent, can count on higher than average German enrollments, and the University of Wisconsin will be able to keep its Scandinavian Studies program.

Barring these demographic and geopolitical realities that support certain programs, the simple fact is that learning most languages is going to become an increasingly niche concern. Those who do it for loved ones, hobbyists, and people who care deeply and passionately about a particular tradition of thinkers. At the moment, I am learning Chinese because my partner is Chinese, and her parents do not speak English fluently. (I, however, am learning Chinese through the other dreaded scourge of language programs, Duolingo, which, in my opinion, only really works well if you are lucky enough to have some grounding in linguistics.) Many of my students take German because they have grandparents who are native German speakers. Japanese will continue to have a small but stable contingent of students who are there because, regardless of whether we agree with the fake Hayao Miyazaki quote that “anime was a mistake,” it is certainly a cultural phenomenon. Some students simply love learning languages. Finally, there are those of us who learned languages to read philosophers and literature in the original language.

Efforts can be made to stanch the bleeding in language programs, though they need to be implemented years before enrollments become an existential issue. Unsurprisingly, these require attuning yourself to what students want. I, for example, am working with several offices at my institution to organize a career, internship, and fellowship fair for companies and institutions headquartered in the German-speaking world. Depending on how you reckon (with or without purchasing power parity [PPP]), Germany is the fourth or fifth largest national economy in the world, and its economy is excellently suited for students in the STEMB tracks, with a high degree of, especially, engineering firms. There are the heavy hitters, Siemens, BASF, etc., but Germany is also renowned for the cluster of often highly specialized, mid-sized firms (referred to as the Mittelstand), which because of their specialization are reliably stable throughout economic turbulence. That stability is increasingly valued by students. Anecdotally, I have noticed among my students an uptick in their desire to not simply visit Germany but stay their for an extended period of time (due, for many students, to the real or perceived deteriorating political and social situation in the US). Such programming could be expanded to other languages, as well, provided the organizer plays to the strengths of their ‘home’ region (Japan, the Middle East, Italy, etc.).

Ultimately, however, such programs would still be broadly in line with increased administrative attempts at cost-cutting and risk over-emphasizing STEMB disciplines as the locus of institutional strategies. They’re stopgaps, in other words. There are plenty of qualified language teachers (and will be plenty more as colleges and universities continue downsizing) who will be tapped to teach, for example, Engineering German and Business German, rendering the field, effectively, an appendage to the STEMB ideology, instead of a discipline in its own right. This means that most programs that follow this path would be able to function with purely adjunct or otherwise contingent labor. Many language instructors who are trained simply in second-language acquisition, if they are lucky enough to have that specialty instead of merely having experience teaching the language, will be placed into a cutthroat environment with dwindling jobs and prospects.

In this strategy of survival (the sadly more likely one), for those of us that care that we are in language disciplines that prize themselves as belonging to traditions that are highly critical of capitalism, technicization, and other trends that are readily identifiable within the STEMB-ified university, for those of us that are not part of the Anglophone status quo (philosophically or otherwise ideologically), for those of who, in other words, hope for a better world, we will either have to abandon our professional and personal ethics or leave the discipline entirely.

But there’s another way, which involves a fundamental rebranding of what regional studies programs are: the study of areas that house philosophical, cultural, and aesthetic traditions without a language requirement. Essentially, what should emerge is a rigorous exploration of these traditions based on ideological tendencies instead of fealty to geographical exclusivity. German studies is uniquely suited to perform such a pivot. “Marx, Nietzsche, Freud” classes already populate course lists across the country. Holocaust & Genocide Studies courses are perennially popular. When I pitch German studies to my students, I emphasize that, because of the centrality of so many German thinkers (who worked in all fields – courses could be designed around everything from the medical humanities to pure math to musicology and beyond), a degree in German should be viewed as, essentially, a classics degree for the modern era. There is, in the 19th and 20th centuries, simply no escape from the Germans. Yes, it would be better for the students to read these thinkers in their original language, and, hopefully, some would, but why is that so necessary? Philosophy programs work with thinkers across multiple languages, but do they have a language requirement? Unless you are at the graduate level, almost definitely no. In an era of increasing translatability, focusing on a target language seems antiquated and more suited to advanced programs than feasible given institutional realities. It is, in other words, easier to teaching the relevant section of The Dictionary of Untranslatables than it is to force students to learn something that they rightly view as increasingly tangential what they are studying. It takes a professional who is familiar with the text to point out translation errors not critique translation in toto. That is, for a trained instructor, literally part of our job description, and it is not something we should expect our students to know.

This sort of approach is amenable to transcultural dialogue and is, in fact, based on it. One cannot, in good conscience, study German culture in the 20th century without studying its effect on the world. Similarly, understanding French culture in the 20th century is impossible without a grounding in German thought. Anyone interested in studying colonialism to pursue decolonial practice will need a solid understanding the ideologies of domination. Programs with this, correctly, intercultural view are forming across the states under the banner of Global Studies. If this sounds like a simple rebranding of Comparative Literature or, going back even further, Weltliteratur, it’s because it is. But that’s precisely how regional studies programs can survive without capitulating to the dominant ideology – branding themselves as relevant to major concerns. That’s impossible when they rely on enrollments in language programs to justify their existence.

To conclude, language programs, because of technological advances, are rapidly becoming obsolete. Even if students are wrong to forgo learning a language because of perceived lack of ROI, their concerns point to a very real, very existential problem for language studies programs – namely, their increasing irrelevance beyond a niche audience that will be, unfortunately, mostly served by contingent and precarious instructors. Instructors who specialize in language instruction, especially in ‘minor’ languages (in the US, that would be, in the European context, Italian, German, Portuguese, and the like), have to prepare for an immediate lack of jobs. Other languages will likely be not that far behind. Those of us who remain (and those of us who are lucky enough to have experience teaching generalist or English-language area studies courses) have to decide how we will proceed: Giving into the ideological and practical demands of the STEMB-ified academic landscape or embracing our strengths. Some may blanch at the possibility of granting a German studies, French studies, Japanese studies, [x] studies degree to a student that does not speak or read the language. Is that really so different from a philosophy student that does not understand ancient Greek? A religious studies student that does not understand Sanskrit? The incipient explosive growth of AI in translation has, in this sense, revealed only the complacency of language – no, area – studies programs. To survive, they need to assess what is really valuable. It’s not knowing how to order noodles instead of potatoes. This does not impinge on other disciplines, but rather pursues a collaborative relationship with them, akin to the quadrivium of medieval European universities. History and French need not be adversaries, but they could each offer French with a History concentration or vice versa degrees. Philosophy programs in the US will need to open themselves up to continental and non-European modes of thinking – should they refuse, probably all the better for the continentals still practicing here. Whither English? The diminishment of the discipline to purely rhetoric & composition jobs, of which several are posted each day nearly throughout the year, will also need to adapt to the new future of AI-aided composition and should also pursue a return not necessarily to their roots but to the great explorers of English language that emerged in literary modernism and came to prominence later in the 20th century.

What matters is the beauty and ugliness of the individual and collaborative contributions of various global cultures to our understanding(s) of the world – and the possibility of a better world.

Breaking History’s Orbit: Reading Posadas with A. M. Gittlitz

Who was J. Posadas and who is he now? This might be taken to be the animating statement of A. M. Gittlitz’s valuable and necessary text I Want to Believe: Posadism, UFOs, and Apocalypse Communism. Long maligned on the left by ‘rational adults’ as a bizarro doomsday cult (or even just as the apotheosis of Trotskyist conspiring, given the tendency’s emphases on entryism and secrecy), Posadism is now cropping up, much as Enver Hoxha did, on the internet as a sort of kitsch leftist hero; where Hoxha had his bunkers, spectral pictures of UFOs are used to excoriate, more or less seriously, the ‘terrestrialist left,’ promising a future of ‘fully automated luxury gay space communism,’ an internet version of the idea of fully automated luxury communism, mainstreamed by Aaron Bastani in his book of the same name.

            Gittlitz does an excellent job answering the first part of our question: “Who was J. Posadas?” But he leaves somewhat fallow the latter half, despite some admirable gestures towards the future. I do not believe this is a fault of the author or the book, although it can barely be said to earn the reference to UFOs in the title and cover except for one or two chapters (it might be hard to market the book without meme references, in all fairness); I hope, rather, to slightly broaden Gittlitz’s scope here. I’m not hunting for faults (if there can be said to be any recurrent issues, they are in copyediting, especially with regards to commas), but trying to seek out areas of potential, particularly with regards to the ‘fiction(s)’ of J. Posadas – a figure who has broken the orbit of history, similar, in certain ways, to that other great Space Ager, Sun Ra, on whose birthday I am now writing this.

            Consequently, I believe the value of this book to be located in:

  • its nuanced and well-researched biographical account of the man we know as J. Posadas, who was a key figure in much of the South American left
  • its opening up towards an understanding of what Posadas means.

*                      *                      *

            Let us say that there are, provisionally, 2 Posadases – Posadas the man and Posadas the fiction. Gittlitz does a superb job of looking behind the curtain and furnishing what must be the most exhaustive account of his actual, historical life. Homero Cristalli (“Posadas” was a “party name”), born 1912, was a life-long committed Trotskyist. Son of proletariat Italian immigrants in Argentina, he sang and played soccer before becoming an organizer – a task at which he excelled because of his manic work ethic and absolute dedication to the cause. Through early victories, he became known to some of the Trotskyist groups in the area, and he steadily became a more important figure, despite his pugnacious nature that led to many splits and expulsions over the years. (This, of course, is nothing unique. Trotskyist groups at the time and, indeed, today, are known for splintering, as the movement tends to be riven by conflict and susceptible to division, the enforced secretiveness leading to a paranoiac worldview.) Cristalli and his comrades assisted a variety of causes throughout the years and were cordial with Guevara. They had cells all across the South American continent, and, as Posadas became more important in the movement of the 4th International, across much of Europe, as well. For a while, Cristalli was one of the central figures in radical South American politics. However, over the years, his support collapsed, and his group was left behind in the 1968 uprisings, until he and his group gradually faded into obscurity – though not before leaving a lasting legacy in radical politics.

            Indeed, far from the doomsday prophesying, UFOs, and cetaceophilism that accompany his legend, most of Cristalli’s life was dedicated simply to the cause. This is borne out through the text, as well; Gittlitz spends the majority of the book going into great detail about these events, keeping an admirable focus on our subject throughout the internecine vagaries of the Trotskyist movement. As such, anyone interested radical politics of the 20th century, especially in South America, will find this book invaluable for the history alone. Yet, if Gittlitz can provide us with such a sober and serious accounting of Cristalli’s influence on the left throughout various historical events, why is there an alien on the cover?

            This is related to the ultimate collapse of the Posadist movement. Over the years, Cristalli became increasingly paranoid, the demands on his recruits, increasingly intense. There was to be no drinking or pre-marital sex (in many cases, there was no post-marital sex either). Homosexualism was viewed as capitalist degeneracy; being out would lead to being kicked out. Cristalli’s fights, always acrimonious, led to more and more denunciations, leading to increased marginalization of the Posadists on the global stage. Through it all, Cristalli was always right and always making promises. The natural conclusion arose: Posadism became, for all intents and purposes, a cult, “a result [Michel Pablo, old comrade of Cristalli, noted] ‘not unique in the international labor movement.’”[1] As circulations of their various papers declined and recruitment stagnated, the movement, always barely democratically organized, became completely centralized around Cristalli, who, towards the very end, purged almost all the old guard, leaving him with no one but his most fervent followers, who would hang on the edge of his every esoteric pronouncement, which became frequently about the potential for plants and animals (especially, yes, the famous dolphins) to become comrades in a world that would arise out of the ashes of nuclear catastrophe. Upon his death, the movement, more or less, died, excepting a few holdouts. (Posadiststoday.com still is up on the internet but seems to be almost entirely inactive.)

            That is, however, only the story of Cristalli. To be sure, it is a story with many morals for the left, strategic and otherwise. Trotskyism remained theoretically vibrant, but its modus operandi was flawed. Entryism leads to paranoia and is only variably successful – if at all. Groups organized around a single leader (what Cristalli called, accidentally nodding towards 2001: A Space Odyssey, “monolithism”) have a tendency towards cultish behavior. Movements organized around national sovereignty are always a hair’s breadth away from fascism (as Cristalli and his comrades learned in the tragic case of Peronism, which led to their final expulsion from Argentina, despite their important early support). These are all historically quantifiable and can be argued more or less logically on the grounds of theory. But the case present here is hardly unique;

until [the release of the documents pertaining to UFOs], Posadism was similar to most other Trotskyist groups… as [the] cult-of-personality, abuse of militants, rabid anti-imperialism, paranoia, extreme zigzagging, and catastrophism were features more or less present innearly every other tendency.[2]

Why then the fascination with Posadism? Because these are only half the story – the story of Cristalli.

            The story of Posadas, on the other hand, is a story of becoming fictional, becoming text. Gittlitz does not reference this directly, instead opening up to it, as noted earlier, yet it is key to understanding where Posadism might go today. However, while almost entirely tacit, there are still numerous references to the fictionality of Posadas, who stands spectrally between the historical real and the historical imaginary.

            J. Posadas was born in Argentina in 1947, as Peronism swept the land. His first words were a mission statement in the new periodical Voz Proletaria, which supported Peronism in order to remain relevant in the eyes of the masses, in contradistinction to some of the other left tendencies at the time. This Posadas was not Cristalli alone, but “democratic centralism personified into a composite penname, a collective Lenin who decisively announced the conclusions of internal debates” – the editorial board of Voz Proletaria itself, speaking from one mouth.[3]

The name was as mysterious then as it is now. Could he be some organic intellectual from Posadas, a village in Argentina’s north once known as an anarchist stronghold, but for little else since? Or could the name refer to one of the several Posadas streets[?] … And what did the ‘J’ stand for?[4]

Posadas started life, in other words, not as a party name, not even properly as a pseudonym, but a sort of phantom figure speaking out through text, instead of with actual words – a fictional character, in other words. One who was engaged in serious political debate, but a fictional character nonetheless. Cristalli, meanwhile, “could barely write” and “his independent attempts at theorization were often painfully vulgar.”[5] In an argument with a competing sect, Cristalli, the central organizational figure of an editorial board that was rapidly attracting recruits and making waves in the Argentine scene, said he “read six” volumes of Capital.[6] Could this really be the same as the historical Posadas? I read this inaugural authorial invention as the start of the process, which would eventually consume Cristalli, of becoming fictional.

            This process would continue as Posadas began to explore the style of stream-of-consciousness in the late 1950’s. In the intervening years, Posadas began to exercise stronger control on his group, expelling members who did not toe his line. Perón’s ouster and the subsequent barring of Peronist sentiments forced greater secrecy on the part of Posadas and his comrades – even more so than the usual strategy of entryism required – which led to “the formation of secret factions in factories,” adding another layer of disconnect between Posadas and the really existing historical situation on the ground.[7] This abstraction from historical reality continued with Posadas’s acquisition of, unsurprisingly, a piece of technology of mechanical reproduction, which would, in the same year that Sputnuik broke orbit, irrevocably split his voice from his body: a “Geloso G.255… a reel to reel [sic] recorder developed for consumer use.”[8] Posadas lost his aura as Cristalli attempting to reach the truth of things through what might even be called a trance state or improvisation; “he talked into the Italian import from dusk until early morning… hand the tape to his secretary… for transcription.”[9] No longer bound by the rules of historical rationality, “strange synchronicities occurred to him between class struggle, science, culture, and philosophy,” subjects for which, as his comrades recalled, he was woefully unprepared.[10] In particular, according to an early recruit, Guillermo Almeyra recalled that “his shortcomings in the scientific field made him believe anything.”[11] However, by the acquisition of the tape recorder, “only his voice mattered,” taking on a character of its own, written onto magnetic tape and re-written the next morning by his secretary.[12] In the subsequent transcription of his stream-of-consciousness, Posadas, one foot in reality (itself already compromised, by enforced secrecy of the movement, by his own misunderstandings of the world, and by even his name alone), one foot in text, dare we even say literature, emerges here as a hybrid figure, phantasmatic body, flickering in and out of the easily apprehendable.

            On the cusp of the 1960’s, in the shadow of the Sixth World Congress, where Posadism would make its most brazen power grab over the Trotskyist movement, the literary Posadas soon emerged as the more central figure of the uneasy dyad.

For years the texts submitted under the name “Posadas” contained some overexuberant claims, but were always written or carefully edited by the movement’s intellectuals. In internal documents there was a clear difference when referring to Luis or Luigi [yet more party names of Cristalli]… and the collective, spiritual Posadas, to whom Luis always referred in the third person… [N]ow [Luis, unedited, was] speaking through the Posadas penname with unrestrained fury.[13]

As we can see, the various figures known as Posadas were beginning to collapse under the single signifier of the pen name, as Cristalli fractured into Luis and Luigi, as well. The writerly name was itself the creation of an author, originally, perhaps Cristalli. No longer a shared fiction, Posadas came to own itself, emerging as an essentially “graphosomatic” figure, to borrow slightly from Avital Ronell, where the body and the literary are nearly coincidental.[14] The subsumption of the historical reality by the fiction was beginning to occur ever more rapidly, as the difference between the two began to haze in a stream-of-consciousness speaking itself, as a spiritual figure, in the word of Gittlitz, taking ownership of itself. If Cristalli was rigidly organized and graspable like his family’s namesake, Posadas was the alluring fire of the red crystal in Herzog’s Herz aus Glas – only if it entranced the glassblower himself.      

Gittlitz, then, is quite right to note that “the mystique of Posadas” serves as an excellent recruitment tool; Posadas, that literary character, reality’s anacoluthon, as de Man might have called him,[15] had been seen by few, according to Gittlitz, but we might say that he had been seen by none, only heard and read.[16] In the imaginary, the recruits’ “mental images ran wild based on his self-aggrandizing,” which is to say, fictional, “writing and the rumors of personal heroism.”[17] Posadas

was a soccer star and manual worker, tragically sidelined by industrial disfigurement and forced to a life of full-time militancy. He organized Argentina’s shoemakers to a major strike that finally brough the previously bourgeois-bohemian Latin American Trotskyist movement to the masses. He then spread his influence throughout the continent, inspiring the Bolivian miners’ insurrection, and directing a guerilla operation that liberated the Guantanamo province… Perhaps he was [like Che] a bearded mestizo freedom fighter.[18]

All of these were more or less true, if exaggerated, except the final facial comparison to Che, but they were usurped by Posadas from Cristalli, transformed by “his thrilling optimism” – tales of derring-do spectrally present in history. Nowadays, to these tales are added his catastrophism (today, nuclear war is replaced by environmental collapse), his emphasis on harmony with nature (exemplified by the dolphin), and, yes, UFOs. With regards to the latter, as Minazzoli, a committed Posadist, asserted,

the belief that humans were the only intelligent life in the universe represents the same type of bourgeois idealism that holds capitalist class society as natural and the best of all possible worlds… [As such,] the Posadist International should recognize in the popularity of UFOs a socialist impulse. The mass fascination with the phenomenon demonstrated a desire to reach the heights of our alien visitors,[19]

to truly encounter the other – the hither side of reality, which would reveal “the capitalist system as backwards.”[20] Just as Posadas had crushed Cristalli, the encounter with the ultimate other – space – “produced an ontological shock that would crush the ‘egotism’ essential to the logic of private property, individualism, class, nationalism, and all the separations produced by capitalism.”[21] It was an overcoming of what Bini Adamczak referred to as “all-too-terrestrial individuals.”[22] The ontological shock that Posadas saw in the cosmos was enacted in his own ontological disavowal, his becoming fictional – not tangible, only a figure of revolution. Gittlitz refers to this revolution as “unimaginable,” but it is clear that Posadas found it deeply at hand, perhaps even in his own decrystallization.[23]

            Posadas reached his apotheosis as this decrystallized Posadas when he finally purged his inner circle, some of whom had been his comrades for decades. In this purgative moment, Cristalli became simply Posadas; there was no one to recognize him as the former any more. Empirical reality had been thrown up. As his writings became more manic, he himself became more poetic, in a graphosomatic sense. If this figure of madness was “irretrievably divorced from real movement for socialism,” riven by conflict, birthing sectlet after seclet, all the better – it nevertheless showed that another world was possible.[24] If Posadas was, to some extent, always a caricature, always a fictive element, the final pronouncement declaring him divorced from reality only serves to underscore the necessity of reading Posadas as text. To some extent, Posadas the character was aware of the great sacrifice he made of Cristalli. “His political texts quickly lost their focus to disjointed reveries of his youth,” and “anecdotes of the history of the International often digressed into stories of the contributions of Minazzoli, Almeyra, Labat, Sendic, and Sierra [the old guard] – strangely sweet memories tinged with regret.”[25]

            It is this Posadas that survives.

Uninterested in the banal tyrannies of Homero Cristalli, the neo-Posadists [of today] preferred to revive Posadas as a folkloric prophet of catastrophe, socialist futurism, and epochal unity. In so doing, they negated the cycles of negation between the individual and the collective, consciousness and existence, and tragedy and farce, to free the true spirit of Posadas.[26]

Gittlitz here approvingly cites Benjamin from the Theses on the Philosophy of History, which I will extend here: “To articulate the past historically… means to seize hold of a memory as it flashes up at a moment of danger. Historical materialism wishes to retain that image of the past which unexpectedly appears to man singled out by history at a moment of danger.”[27]

I would like to append to this quote another from Benjamin, this time from his essay on Goethe’s Elective Affinities:

Critique seeks the truth content of a work of art; commentary, its material content. The relation between the two is determined by that basic law of literature according to which the more significant the work, the more inconspicuously and intimately its truth content is bound up with its material content. If, therefore, the works that prove enduring are precisely those whose truth is most deeply sunken in their material content, then, in the course of his duration, the concrete realities rise up before the eyes of the beholder all the more distinctly they die out in the world… The history of works prepares for their critique, and thus historical distance increases their power. If, to use a simile, one views the growing work as a burning funeral pyre, then the commentator stands before it like a chemist, the critic like an alchemist. Whereas, for the former, wood and ash remain the sole objects, for the latter, only the flame itself preserves an enigma: that of what is alive. Thus, the critic inquires into the truth, whose living flame continues to burn over the heavy logs of what is past and the light ashes of what has been experienced.[28]

The binding of the truth content to the material content can be viewed, in my eyes, precisely as the life-project of Posadas. Cristalli has been sacrificed on the funeral pyre, his body remaining an object, as Posadas rises, metamorphosized into the flames of truth and materiality – and thus a preservative – a fiction, a true work of art. Gittlitz’s book attempts to be something of both critic and commentator, although it most excels at being the latter, but, of course, this is precisely its strength. Just as Posadas prepared himself for his critique, his final sacrifice of his friends and even family cutting his lingering tether to reality to become text, this book delivers the textual Posadas to us, tracing this process until we can only be left with “the poetry of Posadas.”[29]

            “Posadas doesn’t exist,” noted Posadas while arrested in Uruguay.[30] This is correct – Posadas never existed tangibly, just as fire does not exist to modern science, per Bachelard. Perhaps that is why Perón, upon his return to power, chose to specifically denounce him, “strategically shifting the blame to an external and marginal figure,” and, in the process, “turning Posadas into a pop-cultural figure”; “Voz Proletaria,” the Posadist organ, “became widely referred to as Voz Planetaria.” It is precisely when he merged entirely into fiction, a pop-cultural meme, that Posadas was deemed to be most powerful by the capitalists, fulfilling the function of the marginal in philosophy as Derrida understood it. It was an attempt to marginalize the left, but the left, especially the Trotskyists, had done a fine job of that themselves; after 1968, “Trotskyism was largely revealed to be paralyzed by pugilistic splits, isolated within increasingly small sects.”[31] And the history of the New Left and its failure to combat the rise of neoliberalism should need no recapitulation; the same can be said of almost all leftist-led colonial insurrections, which were either quashed, themselves turned into cultish governments, or, most often, both. So it is, ironically, that the fiction brought forth a new reality: what Gittlitz refers to as “maniacal hope.”[32] This persistence of ideological revolt continued through stories and songs, changing, as fiction does, around the curvature of recent events. When Peronism made its final transition to deadliness, it is this fictional Posadas who survived and carried on the banner of hope against a backdrop of catastrophe; by becoming literature, he survived and continues to survive, as a preservative flame, a perpetual spark of revolution.

            This, undoubtedly, is all a thoroughly irrational act – becoming only literature, destroying one’s relationships to become a pen name. However, as Jonathan Eburne reminds us, “to think wildly – even badly – is to exercise a right to creativity that underwrites rational, independent thinking precisely because it poses a threat to its self-assurance.”[33] The undecidable, graphosomatic Posadas arrives here as simultaneously as, in Eburne’s terms, outsider theorist and outsider theory itself, as a figure of “maniacal hope.” Bloch short-circuited through Nietzsche’s schizoid textuality of “On Truth and Lying in an Extra-Moral Sense,” promising an encounter with the hither side of history, the alterity of the future. Posadas was and is, in Sun Ra’s words, “an art form of dimensions tomorrow.”

We do well to recall here that Sun Ra was also viewed as a cult leader, making outrageous requests of his musicians; he, too, improvised on the verge of madness, writing his music and poetry onto magnetic tape. Both are figures who broke the orbit of material history, their visages calling out hope, “vibrant disruptions in the bleak history of [liberatory politics] and the hopeless banality of the present.”[34] These are not the “castles in the air” excoriated by Marx and Engels, but rather fictions that think from outside the traditional realms of rationality – modes of thought, orientations towards the world, but not programs. That is the day-to-day work for Cristalli, until its failure deemed him to be material content, only a precondition for Posadas.

I will close with an excerpt from Posadas’s last text, quoted by Gittlitz:

In the workers’ state, the flowers live without worry, because they are not stripped uselessly, they are not mistreated. They do not feel mistreated. You can pluck a flower, but in this act, there is a continuation of your life, even if it ceases to live, it causes us to live. It is part of the continuation of life.[35]


[1] Gittlitz, A. M., I Want to Believe: Posadism, UFOs, and Apocalypse Communism (London: Pluto Press 2020) 161.

[2] Gittlitz 110.

[3] Gittlitz 50.

[4] Gittlitz 48.

[5] Gittlitz 52-53.

[6] Gittlitz 53.

[7] Gittlitz 64.

[8] Gittlitz 69. This device, with its chunky colorful buttons and inimitable mid-century Italian stylings, is now a collector’s item, retailing for several hundred dollars. Italian design was, at that historical moment, rather futuristically inclined; 1957 also saw the release of the iconic Fiat 500, the Ferrari 250 Testa Rossa, and was the second production year of the disco volante-esque Alfa Romeo Duetto.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid. 50.

[12] Ibid. 69. Emphasis mine.

[13] Ibid. 75. Emphasis original.

[14] Ronnell speaks of the “graphosomatology of the text” in Stupidity (Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press 2003).

[15] See: De Man, Paul, “The Concept of Irony,” Aesthetic Ideology (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1997).

[16] Gittlitz 80.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Ibid. 80-81.

[19] Ibid. 107.

[20] Ibid.  109.

[21] Ibid.  149.

[22] Adamczak, Bini. Yesterday’s Tomorrow: On the Loneliness of Communist Specters and the Reconstruction of the Future, trans. Adrian Nathan West (Cambridge: MIT Press 2021) 76.

[23] Gittlitz 150.

[24] Ibid.  152.

[25] Ibid. 153-154.

[26] Ibid. 199.

[27] Benjamin, Walter, “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” trans. Harry Zohn, Illuminations (New York: Harcourt 1968) 255.

[28] Benjamin, Walter, “Goethe’s Elective Affinities,” Selected Writings 1: 1913-1926 (Boston: Belknap Press 2004) 297-298.

[29] Gittlitz x.

[30] Ibid. 118.

[31] Ibid. 111.

[32] Ibid. 2.

[33] Eburne, Jonathan, Outsider Theory: Intellectual Histories of Unorthodox Ideas (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 2018) 25.

[34] Gittlitz 190.

[35] Ibid. 154.

A fragmented review of Oil Spill – Ashlands

Stream or buy Ashlands here
  • As an oil spill seeps into groundwater, poisoning it, Oil Spill seeps into the soundscape, enriching it. Maybe that’s ultimately the purpose of black metal music. Is it any coincidence that this emerged towards the nadir of ecological care and the acme of extractive capitalism? A time of neoliberal contentment that stood on ground rendered vulnerable to fracking earthquakes, now tumbling downwards, towards the abyss? The blackest oil is drilled, the blackest sounds that can be created, like soot generated from a petrochemical reaction. Hence: Ashlands.
  • Despite the occasional protestation, black metal was never nihilist. Indeed, the feasibility of any true nihilism actually existing should be doubted; often, it is a veneer for hedonism. Hedonism is concomitant with destruction. Oil Spill tells us this with its very name.
  • Where is the violence of the music directed? Towards itself first of all, and then subsequently the listener, generating a zone of self-reflexivity. Oil Spill against oil spills, a negation borne out through the violence of the music and its foregrounding of the fecundity of poison. Memento mori.
  • They call themselves “scorching Texas black metal.” This can be read as two separate phrases, as well: “scorching Texas” and “black metal.” The former describes an action taken against a state, a geographical demarcation, a burning, perhaps as of a sacrifice according to its own petrologic. The second describes the slag that remains after the former, spinning a tale of traces.
  • In the battle between carnival and lent, Oil Spill is the nun emerging from the church with a stigmata that can barely be seen and perhaps isn’t there except in the eye of an overeager art critic. Stigmata of a stigmata.
  • Oil Spill is an acceleration of the contradictions, the wail of the saxophone grating like a valve being opened, but it bears the brunt of the results itself. Thus it metonymically gestures towards two possible futures.
  • Black metal is inherently utopian.
  • Black metal is inherently hellish.
  • Black metal, with its queasy tempos, with its temporal acceleration that shorten the experience of what might traditionally be called “musical time,” opens up towards deep time, ontological time. In this space-time, this temporary autonomous zone, the logic of non-contradiction is suspended and hierarchization becomes dubious – vulnerable to oil spills, viscously reflecting many colors, generative out of the black.

Desert Plants and Dronoclasm: On the Difficulty of Describing the Experience of Minimalist Music

Given at Minimalism Extended: The Seventh International Conference on Minimalist Music (2019), hosted by Cardiff University

Logan Criley, Daphne 2016

How can one really communicate the experience of minimalist music, which aside from being perpetually eulogized, seems to continually have heaps of strange descriptive language foist upon it? Especially when one is considering works of drone, such as the ‘topological’ music in La Monte Young’s Dream House, one is confronted by its sheer bareness. In the case of the Dream House, one might say that there are 5 tones being played simultaneously from a custom Rayna synthesizer. But that is a description of the process, not of the experience. Some minimalist music is described as calming, as in the case of much New Age music, some, painful, such as the early works of Young. In themselves, these relatively simple reactions don’t align with the depth of feeling that one experiences (or doesn’t, as in the case of the NY Times’ early critics) when engaged in the perception of minimalist music.

            Perhaps as a reflexive answer to this, writings on the subject often reach for odd metaphors and neologisms. The title of Walter Zimmerman’s classic yet rare Desert Plants is one such example. The obfuscatory works on display in 2017’s Sustain//Decay: A Philosophical Investigation of Drone Music and Mysticism (from which “dronoclasm” originates) are another. This paper seeks to think through this. I assert that the difficulties in describing minimalist music with quotidian language arise out of its fundamental, ontological indeterminacy – difficulties that I myself ran into repeatedly during the construction of this essay, which, for that reason, must only be taken as deeply provisional. I wish to explore not just the insufficiency of normal language in the discourse of minimalist music but also think through the idea of the general difficulties in approaching minimalism. To do so, I will employ a deconstructive method in a bipartite structure. The first section will recapitulate some of the writings on the subject from composers and the theoretico-critical apparatus, both popular and academic, in order to think more deeply about their attempts to grapple with the seeming insufficiency of quotidian language in writing about minimalism. The second will adopt a post-structuralist perspective, drawing from Derrida’s methodology and the works of Julia Kristeva, to consider possible paths of language that may allow us to approach minimalism without eliding its apparently mysterious power.

            “Minimalist music” is itself always already a fraught term with a complicated history that may have begun in the ‘60’s or ‘70’s and certainly gained widespread currency only in the ‘80’s – a term that itself seems wholly unsatisfactory, which faced and faces several pretenders to the throne, including, but not limited to, hypnotic music, process music, trance music, drone, and, recently, even certain subgenres of metal. And as we just heard, Repetitief. It was approached in its early years with thus already a sense of apprehension and circumlocution. I will only highlight a few examples, and I hope you will forgive me the paucity, given the time constraints at hand. (Further, the trends I identify are not as applicable to a more ‘traditional’ composer like Glass who creates more easily identifiable ‘works,’ as defined by Lydia Goehr and Jacques Attali.)

            As recalled by Edward Strickland, Peter Yates once remarked that the performance of one of La Monte Young’s various Tortoise pieces “got very close to the psychological nerve of ritual” (which, interestingly, is extremely similar to the language that would be used around the same time for Irv Teibel’s “psychoacoustic” Environments series of field recordings). In contradistinction to this psychical reading, John Perrault once described a concert by Young as “almost unbearably loud… At first to even enter the auditorium seemed too dangerous to risk, for the sound was painfully loud even with the doors closed. Entering was like being hit in the face with a blast of hot wind or like walking into a room full of brine and discovering that surprisingly enough it was still possible to breathe… [it] sounded somewhat like… close-up foghorns, helicopter engines, electric turbines… [Yet] it was like hearing a small piece of eternity.” Let us pay attention to the many “likes” here. Perrault was making a comparison instead of a straightforward description. Perrault had to go over the top – he had to make similes and go forth poetically. Even the eminently academic Strickland himself felt compelled to reach out to these pieces poetically, claiming that Young’s pieces “engulf[ed] the consciousness of the audience.”

            Further, Young’s own insistence on the mathematics of his pieces, extending out of his adoption of just intonation, is something of a smokescreen. We hear not the two sounds but their relationship – later picked up by composers experimenting explicitly with overtones, i.e. Charlemagne Palestine. Numerical description, while invaluable for the reproduction of these pieces (often the titles of La Monte’s later pieces were about as close to sheet music as he got), doesn’t really capture the experience of minimalist music as much as it delineates the sonic realm we are exposed to. In this sense, despite the precision of his method, Young’s music can be said to elide the mathematics that structure it, in much the same way that cardinal numbers remain a platonic ideal, useful for reckoning but relatively far from a true accounting of our everyday experience. Hence Young’s commentary on his own Well-Tuned Piano that drifts from “composite waveforms” to sounds that “became suspended in the air like a cloud” in the space of a sentence.

            Lest we think that all of this cloud talk is your standard ‘60’s-era folderol, contemporary appraisals have, if anything, delved further into the abyss of poetical descriptions. One need look no further than the 2017 collected volume Sustain//Decay, edited by Owen Coggins and James Harris. (Coggins is a frequent critic and chronicler of the UK doom metal scene that contains luminaries such as Bong a band I wish I could have focused on here.) Featuring essay titles such as the pop cultural “Non-Terminator: Rise of the Drone Gods,” the esoteric “Cymatic Church,” and the titular (for this paper) portmanteau “Dronoclasm,” we are confronted here with a dizzying array of approaches – more or less successful (of the essays, the only one that I would really recommend would be Steven Shakespeare’s excellent “Drone Construction: Philosophy of Identity in Conan’s Horseback Battle Hammer”). There are a variety of tactics that the various authors employ, but one of the most frequent is linguistic hand-waving. Dronoclasm is but one example – there is also hieroeidetic, the “hiero-“ prefix of which is, in the author’s own words, “not qualified,” to name just one. But it isn’t just the neologism itself: “dronoclasm” is something “traced on the aether” which is above our “gross, mechanical realm… herald[ing] a shower of rose petals appearing from thin air.” This deeply metaphysical mode of thought would seem to be a reaction to the difficulties that some of the other authors we have dealt with in mobilizing everyday language to explicate minimalist music.

            But then what is it about minimalism that lends itself to the poetical and psychically-oriented critical writing and compositional intent/reflection of the 1960’s and the impetus towards metaphysics on the part of post-“theory” contemporary writers?

            I mentioned my plan at the outset to use something of a deconstructive method here. That all sounds like a good idea, but when it came time to write this paper, I found myself hitting the same roadblocks over and over again. I was thoroughly ensconced in a cabin in the woods near a rushing creek with books upon books and my collection of minimalist music stored on my laptop. Nothing was germinating, and I became largely terrified of even approaching the paper after the first section. My initial plan for this paper was to mount a criticism on the various ways that an approach that placed too much emphasis on the body would simply end up reifying the mind-body dualism and/or that a metaphysical approach was fundamentally empty and even violent and harmful, but how to put that all into words? It’s easy enough to criticize others and quite another to put something new forward; it is, in fact, difficult to describe or even theorize the description of minimalist music. The title of this piece became, ironically, a self-fulfilling prophecy; my own language was far too poetical, too distant, perhaps even too post-structuralist. A difficulty indeed. So I retreated, ran away. Wandered around pretending I was Jean C. Roché, the French field recording master, waiting with my invisible microphone to capture the call of a rare bird. The situation was intolerable, interminable, trying – not unlike a marathon drone album itself. And into books I dove! In particular, I stumbled upon an intriguing novel by an American jack-of-all-trades, Willis George Emerson (in addition to being an author, he founded a town in Wyoming – a town with much the same geography as La Monte Young’s birthplace in Idaho). It is a hollow-earth story from 1908 called The Smoky God. Here, I found this, my path forward:

A man builds a house for himself and family. The porches or verandas are all without, and are secondary. The building is really constructed for the conveniences within. Olaf Jansen makes the startling announcement through me, an humble instrument, that in like manner, God created the earth for the ‘within’ – that is to say, for its lands, seas, rivers, mountains, forests and valleys, and for its other internal conveniences, while the outside surface of the earth is merely the veranda, the porch, there things grow by comparison but sparsely, like the lichen on the mountain side, clinging determinedly for bare existence.

Willis George Emerson

            My little rabbit ears immediately pricked up at the mention of lichen. What is it with flora, cacti and lichen alike, clinging to the edge of existence that makes me think of minimalist music? Why is always related to edges – for the “clasm” of “dronoclasm” is from the Greek κλύζω, a washing off, as of a film or layer? Where “dronoclasm” points towards a metaphysics, there’s something pleasingly materialist about the plants. The earth isn’t really hollow, there isn’t really some layer that can be washed off – there are only lichen and desert plants. In a word, a word charged by its association with Derrida, there is something at the margins.

            For Emerson’s narrator, the utopia on the inside of the earth was filled with music, rich symphonies were sung by thousands of well-trained voices. It is hard for me to imagine a more maximalist vision of music than that. And the use of the word “symphony” shows us that we are working within the “work” paradigm as evinced by Lydia Goehr, which assumes, usually tacitly, a discrete existence – one that would exclude the legitimacy of lichen on the outside, a pale comparison to the richness of the harmonies in the lost soul of the earth, despite its clear reality and potential impact.

            What are we to make of the fact that there is still this lichen hanging on the bare cliff face of the world? Why did Zimmerman thematize American composers, mostly minimalists, as desert plants, scraggly and at the edge of survival? There is no metaphysical guarantor, so there are only those who recognize the edge that they are on and those that pine for a “wholeness” that can never exist. In such a sense, the attitude towards reduction that animates much of minimalist music becomes something like a self-recognition – a sublimation of idealism towards materiality. This is, understandably, a frightening prospect that jolts us out of what Edmund Husserl called the “natural attitude,” our default modality of being in the world that projects singularity and idealism outward, a sort of active passivity that imposes order on the things around us. When it has come to music, this has often manifested itself as the aforementioned “work” paradigm. The reduction and indeterminacy of minimalism shows us the lie here.

            How does this process work? When one thinks of edges, margins, the bareness of life, one is necessarily made uncomfortable, filled with Angst in the German sense. This feeling is one of abjection.

            The philosopher Julia Kristeva, whose works are frequently employed by scholars of other ‘extreme’ types of music (Woodrow Steinken and Jasmine Shadrack, for example, both use her in their analyses of black metal), did not theorize abjection as much as she danced around it. This is because it is a fundamentally destabilized ideation – beyond all hope of conceptualization. She, much like those who deigned to describe minimalist music, often defaulted to imagistic or poetic language, stuttering out a series of notions, like echoes from a dream. One particularly memorable example is the invocation of the “film on top of milk.” While this happens less nowadays with hyper-homogenization of dairy products, we should remember that the film that would accrue on the top of a glass or bottle of milk is fat, a constitutive element of the milk itself. A (chemically) essential component of milk is reduced out of the milk and rises to the top. Why do we find this uncomfortable to the point of abjection? Because it shows us the lie in understanding milk as a solid, singular object and opens up to the radical possibility of flux; in so doing, it begins to show us as possibly incomplete and indeterminate ourselves.

            Let us try to venture a minimalist definition of minimalist music: it takes what has been historically embellished and attempts to find the constitutive elements. Melodies are repeated without harmony, harmony exists without melody, overtones are rigorously explored, etc. These elements, in minimalist music, rise to the top, even as in a more traditional “work,” they would have been present, if tacitly ignored in favor of the totality of experience. In this way, to return to Kristeva, minimalism is all film. It takes the supplement, which here I’m using in the Derridean sense, and lavishes its attention thereon.

            For Derrida, the supplement, the marginal – that was the true guarantor of an experience, as it showed us an outside that would make the inside discrete. Yet we remember his famous dictum of collapse: il n’y a pas de hors-texte. Minimalist music, by way of its reduction to the barest elements, shows the power of the supplement, the power of the margin as this guarantor, while collapsing it in the moment. This is why, I assert, it is so difficult to describe minimalist music, why normal language fails or seeks recourse in subjective judgments. What essentially emerges is the necessity of a poetics; the normal language that we use to describe a metaphysically discrete piece can only reveal its finitude when confronted with the abjection of minimalist music, its radical self-sufficient supplementarity that chafes at the edges of the “work,” and, in some cases, overcomes it. We may, perhaps, be bound to call minimalist music a desert plant, lichen clinging to bare life, the film on top of milk, because ordinary language that strives for one-to-one signification exhausts itself at the edge of existence.

            This playful attitude, vacillating between supplementarity and self-sufficiency, this chiastic structure, reveals minimalism’s fundamental indeterminacy, as do the choices of metaphor. Is the film on top of milk, milk? Is lichen algae or fungus? Are desert plants, plants – or something reduced to the most minimal components? Minimalist music is not indeterminate in the sense of aleatory composition, but in its ontological existence. Attempts to recuperate a metaphysical guarantor for the experience of minimalist music can only do violence to the pieces, reducing them to their own hollow earth theories.

This is precisely why we should be wary of a metaphysical attitude (to say nothing of the fact that mysticism, so mysteriously invoked in the title of Coggins and Harris’s collection, need not be metaphysical). Indeed, metaphysics is a totalizing worldview that does not allow for difference – and especially nothing like the ethical injunction of the Derridean différance. It is often used to paper over the aporias of experience, reinforcing the logic of non-contradiction over and above a chiastic both/and structure. This has, in a wider view, beyond minimalist music, led to ethical crises and politics of exclusion to this very day. (As an aside, this wariness towards metaphysics should not necessarily be taken as a condemnation of religion, for example. There are plenty of religious and even occult discourses that do not reduce their subject matter into a simple dichotomy – Jean-Luc Marion is a good example for Catholicism, and Aleister Crowley’s “scientific” and nearly poststructuralist treatment of the occult is another.) While criticizing metaphysics’ use in writing about minimalism may seem irrelevant or like picking nits, it is symptomatic of toxic worldviews that we can see on the rise across the world today – and it should be avoided.

            In the end, perhaps Terry Riley comes closest to describing this phenomenon without recourse to metaphysics. He has repeatedly, in, for example, an interview with Keyboard Magazine and as an introduction to a collection of his piano pieces, emphasized the similarity between his works and echoes. “Every single great moment of music that’s come through you has come through you literally… it never originated in anything that you call yourself but actually just passed through,” he notes. Let us take this to its furthest conclusion: music is predicated on a recurrence of the same, without discernible origin, no guarantor of an identifiable ur-sound, which is precisely why in the 21st edition of Nate Wooley’s Sound American, Riley’s work was referred to as an “echoplex” (though this is also a reference to his use of the tape delay device of the same name). Minimalism draws attention to this, by showing the bare amount needed to create something memorable and deeply affecting. There is only echo, only haunting melodies ringing out as a threnody in the halls of time. An echoplex, in other words – “plex” defined as many parts coming together, but, here, as whispers of an unrecuperable past.

            In a related way, Young favors the term “ecstasy” – a standing out, a rising, from ek-stasis. We are tempted to ask: Whence? When? But these are the wrong questions; confronted with the troubling abjection of minimalist  music, troubling to our very conception of ourselves as discrete, univocal beings, we are both reduced and elevated to a status of poetics. Perhaps, we can only have recourse to language on the margins, language that shies away from the mere possibility of one-to-one signification (this possibility being the root of the neologistic impulse of certain metaphysical thinkers) and instead ventures towards our own finitude.

            This poetical attitude is, by its nature, difficult, but perhaps is concomitant with the mythopoiesis that crops up throughout minimalist music from Young to Drexciya, and, as I hinted at yesterday, Egyptian Lover, if we want to bring in the fringes. The difficulty of describing minimalist music, in the end, arises from the difficulty of understanding its experience, as it elides the logic of either/or and confronts us with the both/and. Who wouldn’t be at a loss for words?

My last (intercontinental) academic conference

Still from Tommy Boy

Next week, I’ll begin the grueling process of travelling to Wales for an academic conference on minimalist music. There are two layovers, one in Detroit, and one in Amsterdam’s Schiphol airport – easily one of my least favorite airports in the world. The conference lasts for four days, and then I come home and immediately start teaching the first week of classes with some wicked jetlag. My paper seems shaky, and I’m incredibly nervous about how it will be received. My department is not picking up as much of the tab as I wanted (my own fault, as I didn’t submit the correct forms on time because applying to this conference was a last-minute decision).

It’s going to be a great. I can’t wait to commingle with my compatriots, advance our collective knowledge, meet new people, and broaden my perspectives, something which can really only happen in a face-to-face interaction, the experience of which cannot be replicated digitally.

Yet, I think, this will be my last intercontinental conference for the foreseeable future. The time has come for us academics to reckon with our carbon footprint, and conferences contribute probably more than anything else to this. This seems especially egregious given that we are living truly in an age of a communication revolution.

I’m not naïve enough to think that we can digitally replicate the conference experience. And, as a scholar of both Martin Heidegger and Theodor Adorno, I’m constantly on the watch for ways in which the sparks of life may gradually be subsumed under the yoke of progress, technology, and capitalism. There’s something deeply special about forming a relationship with someone you met on a chance encounter after one or another talk; I met one of the future members of my dissertation committee (and a valued interlocutor in my life at large) at my very first conference as a grad student. This probably would not have happened without the time afforded by the conference atmosphere and, in all likelihood (though not impossibly), would have been an already foreclosed option if I just delivered my talk over a screen.

The future lies in exploiting that “not impossible” gap and learning how to live with it. Despite stereotypes (and my own personal fetishization of the Hölderlinturm), academics are social creatures. Research often lives and dies by collaboration. This will (hopefully) never change.

But, as stewards of knowledge, we need to consider how we are impacting the world. In three years, even as a graduate student, I have travelled abroad for conferences twice and well more national trips besides. There is a not insignificant amount of carbon in the air because of my own work.

How can we square this cavalier attitude towards global warming when it comes to conferences with the lofty goals of the university? (Bourgeois self-coddling? Yes, probably a lot of that.) What can we do?

Plane-pooling might help, but I don’t know how feasible that is (or if it even exists). And international research must continue – a week or a month or a year in the field is invaluable – so that’s out of the question. But what can be easily done? Changing conference culture. Figuring out how to work the “not impossible” that I mentioned above to preserve as much of the conference atmosphere as possible without face-to-face interaction is important. So is figuring out how to make academia more sustainable.

Divestment movements are one excellent way to do this, but they are also a way to avoid self-reflection. It’s time to look in the airplane bathroom mirror.

The Catholic and Communist Case Against “The Catholic Case for Communism”

Caspar David Friedrich, The Dreamer

As a provocation (and because of my own sympathies), I cannot help but admire “The Catholic Case for Communism.” This is (and has been) a necessary conversation since the long 19th century (or even longer if we pay attention to the formal content of certain social movements, such as medieval monasticism, as opposed to the vague semiotic handwaving of nomenclatural insistence), beginning at least prior to the encyclical Nostis et nobiscum by Pope Pius IX. Which is why it is so baffling to me that the author seems to ignore the apostolic tradition, the breadth of intra-ecclesiastical debate on social life, and, essentially, any philosophical growth within the Church (preferring a nearly mythico-cultic reverence to the early days of the faith), to say nothing of the many conspicuous absences of the Catholic socialist/communist tradition. That these rhetorical problems are wedded to a fundamentally empty vision of communism that somehow manages to throw in some Castro worship for good measure means that this provocation is merely that. The author misunderstands both communism and Catholicism and ends up doing a disservice to both.

Let’s start at the title: “The Catholic Case for Communism.” Does it provide a Catholic case? Given that it is not rooted in any sort of tradition other than the work of Dorothy Day – not even mentioning the various encyclicals published against communism or socialism – we have to say no. Arguably, given the article’s extreme narrowness, we could not even say it provides a catholic case. This is a shame, especially since there are any number of threads that the author could have picked up. Aside from Dorothy Day, there is the entire tradition of the Catholic Worker, which was mentioned merely in passing. The great theologian Bede Jarrett, especially with his book Medieval Socialism, springs to mind. The entire movement of liberation theology. Even if one would choose not to deal with these thinkers, instead taking a more postmodern tack, there is a whole group of French theologians representing phenomenology (i.e. Jean-Luc Marion, Jean-Louis Chretien, etc.) whose work could be deployed. None of these are without controversy, but I would rather have a real conversation that’s aware of the rich tradition of these modern thinkers.

Indeed, and those are just the contemporary thinkers. They (and the more modern discussion of communism) are enfolded into a much broader tradition of thinking through forms of life. Obviously, our interactions with our fellow man is a central point in much theological (and philosophical) thought. Aquinas, in particular, dwelled on these issues for his entire life. I would not deign to suggest any particular reading for Aquinas one way or another due to my own ignorance on the topic, but to leave him out of the conversation entirely seems odd to the point of evasiveness. This is to say nothing of the rich discussion there is to be had about the potentially communistic structures in the monastic tradition; this has been elucidated by thinkers far more intelligent than I, but, to name a few who have reckoned with it, one thinks of Jarrett, of course, and Giorgio Agamben (whose secular status should not exclude him from this conversation – although he would likely resent and resist being brought into it!).

Naturally, the early Church is invoked. This is not without reason or without value. But one really has to wonder how it is justified (or rather, isn’t). The Church, like anything living, grows through the years. It accrues internal rules and expands its consciousness. Neither of these things are bad – and, in fact, they are often good. So to call for a progressivism that is seemingly a regression strikes me as poorly thought-out at best and cutting off one’s nose to spite the face at worst. We will not move forwards by looking only backwards. This is not to say that the early Church has nothing to teach us – far from it! But we must view it as part of a larger continuum and take into account our own position as contemporary viewers projecting our desires and understanding onto a past that may or may not be compatible with this.

Finally, and perhaps most disturbingly, is the paucity of Biblical citations in the article. Catholicism is rooted in the paschal mystery which is relayed to us not simply by tradition and ritual, but, crucially, the Word. Here the Bible is treated as some sort of fetish object – a pure rock, an impenetrable collection of ideas and feelings, instead of a living text that can and must be approached. It is duly trotted out seemingly without care or thought to serve a supporting role, sans any real exegesis, as though the author were going to pick up snakes in a carnival sideshow ostensibly based on the word of the Lord.

These are hard conversations to be had, but, if the author truly wants to make a Catholic case, they will need to actually have them. I am personally both a Catholic and a communist, and I wrestle with these issues on a daily basis. I have long discussions with Catholics far more dedicated than myself, ranging from my mother to close friends. And these have all led me to the perspective that these conversations need to occur in good faith with an appreciation of nuance.

There is no nuance to be found here, especially not in its treatment of communism, which falls prey to the worst tropes of apologism for regimes that falsely call themselves communist and feeds into a general misunderstanding of what communist thinkers actually represent. That the article notes that Dorothy Day supported, albeit with qualifications, the Castro regime in Cuba should already begin to give us pause. The leftist impulse to defend so-called “actually-existing” socialism is sensible insofar as it represents a hopeful attitude and can boost morale. Yet this is one of the most pernicious views that continues to haunt the communist movement today. As hinted at in my introductory paragraph, any analysis that wishes to be worthwhile needs to examine the actual content of its object. Believing that a regime is communist simply because its leader says so is like believing that I am a Penn State football player because I’m wearing a jersey; it is exactly this absurd. That both the right and the left continue to give this argument weight is, frankly, embarrassing.

Many communists, frequently denounced online as “ultra-leftists,” have historically made this point. The most penetrating of these is probably Amadeo Bordiga, who, while a virulent atheist, correctly analyzed the social form of the USSR as “state capitalism,” a view that was shared by even more moderate voices in the left, such as the ex-Yugoslavian Milovan Djilas. This is to say in plainer terms that it maintained generally capitalistic modes of production only in and through the state. (This is, it is worth noting, only an intensification of what we find in capitalist societies, which are essentially borne out through the largesse of the state, which we can see from the simple fact that Walmart’s business model would not function without a government program such as food stamps to the deep implication of the capitalist state in even our cultural habits, manifest in the government’s ‘90’s-era infatuation with the vacuous Schindler’s List.) This has been the case with nearly every dictatorial regime (ostensibly communist or not) of the 20th and 21st centuries with more of less equality promised and delivered, as one can see from the formal similarities between the petrostates of Libya under Ghaddafi and the so-called “Bolivarian revolution” of Venezuela. There is no reason, logical or moral, to continually, albeit often tacitly, support these dictators out of some misguided viewpoint of solidarity, just as there is no reason to not define one’s own terms with the assumption that, of course, the reader knows what communism is.

So what would an actual, good-faith engagement with communism entail? As noted, first of all, we need to dispense with the idea that large scale communism has ever been tried[1] with perhaps the sole exception of the early Leninist years of the USSR, which quickly degenerated into state capitalism because of a lack of international support, Stalin’s political maneuvering (denounced strongly by Lenin himself prior to his death in the famous “Testament”), and the need to rapidly industrialize a country that was essentially feudal – a prospect that Trotsky later recounted in his famous letter to America was doomed to fail (and would never have been anticipated by Marx absent international support). But more so than this simple admission is a rigorous engagement with the massive history of critical communist thought.

A quote here and there from Marx’s self-admittedly reductive pamphlet, The Communist Manifesto, and “Critique of the Gotha Program” simply will not cut it; it’s not even enough to engage with Marxian thought, which reached its apotheosis in the three volumes of Capital. Claims that these sorts of rhetorical evasions are necessary for an introduction are simply intellectually dishonest. You don’t need to be well-versed in Marx’s inversion of Hegelian dialectical logic to understand simple concepts that would ultimately find resonance with Catholic thought.

This is even more starkly illustrated in the sheer absence of any engagement with post-Marxist thinkers in the communist tradition. Theodor Adorno relentlessly eviscerated the emptiness of modernity, decried the grasp that commodities hold over us, analyzed the roots of fascism and mechanized genocide, and so on. Ernst Bloch maintained a ceaseless dedication to the cause of hope. There are simply too many to list and explain adequately, and I cannot hold the article’s lack of exhaustiveness against it for this precise reason. But to favor a few quotes here and there instead of aligning similar critiques that Catholicism and communism wield against the modern epoch threatens the whole premise of bringing these two seemingly disparate Weltanschauungen together in the first place.

I want to believe that there is a synthesis between these two parts of my life – desperately so. I do not believe that my studied adherence to a system of thought that is based on the promise of equality, charity, and dignity should clash with my studied adherence to another system of thought that is based on the promise of equality, charity, and dignity. But there are, of course, difficult conversations to be had, to say nothing of the long history of friction between the two groups. Precisely because of this, these conversations will be difficult. This difficulty should be welcomed, however, because it means that we will no longer pit strawman against strawman. There is no room for a snake-oil panacea of palliative platitudes here. I have one heart that beats with love for my fellow man – that this love is borne out through my embrace of both communism and Catholicism should not be a surprise.


[1] It should be noted that other small-scale attempts at communistic living have been made, the most famous of these being the kibbutzim of Israel.